China is appraised to have the world's largest exploitable reserves of shale gas, although several legal, regulatory, environmental and investment-related issues will likely restrain its scope. China's capacity to successfully face these hurdles and produce commercial shale gas will have a crucial impact on the regional gas market and on China's energy mix, as Beijing strives to decrease reliance on imported oil and coal, while attempting to meet growing energy demand and maintain a certain level of resource autonomy. The development of the unconventional natural gas extractive industry will also endow China with further negotiating power to obtain more advantageous prices from Russia and future liquefied natural gas (LNG) suppliers. This paper, adopting a comparative perspective, underlines the trends learned from unconventional fuel development in the United States, emphasizing their potential application to the Chinese context in light of recently signed production-sharing contracts between qualified foreign investors and China. The wide range of regulatory and enforcement problems in this matter are accrued by an extremely limited liberalization of gas prices, lack of technological development, and political hurdles curbing the opening of resource extraction to private investors. These issues are exacerbated by concerns related to the risk of water pollution deriving from mismanaged drilling and fracturing, absence of adequate regulation framework and industry standards, entailing consequences on social stability and environmental degradation.
Furthermore, shale formations are found in almost every region of the globe, thus the potential for shale gas development is of great relevance.
2 Although shale gas represents a revolutionary element in the global energy framework, several regulatory and environmental concerns related to its extraction and production processes have been raised, in particular about the use of hydraulic fracturing fluids and the consequential risk of drinking water contamination. 3 As the "shale gas revolution" that took place in the United States has highlighted, menacing human health and environmental concerns continue to dog shale gas development. In that respect, given the global scope of its potential, it is crucial to assure that the development of shale gas resources will be carried out in an environmentally sound manner. 4 China is aware of the importance of unconventional gas as a carbon-friendly energy source and pivotal element in achieving the country's future energy and environmental objectives. Being the country the largest source of increases in greenhouse gas emissions, China's capacity to substitute coal with cheaper gas as its primary electricity generating fuel has the potential to represent a huge step toward global warming mitigation. However, China features the absence of comprehensive legal instruments addressing the potential environmental hazards of shale gas extraction and weak enforcement of environmental laws and regulations. This paper will examine: 1) the implications on the world's energy market and an Integrated Approach on National and International Stage", Coordinated by University of Turin -Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza (Italy).
its relevance vis-à-vis energy security; 2) it will carry out a comprehensive review of the current development of shale gas exploration in China and its strategic significance in the global energy scenario; 3) it will also look at the loopholes and inconsistencies in the current Chinese legal and regulatory framework, including the institutional shortcomings that hinder effective enforcement of environmental provisions, the pricing and fiscal regime and the current barriers to foreign investments' access to the Chinese energy market, which is in strong contradiction with the need for technology and know-how; 4) it reviews the U.S. experience to date and questions whether this could constitute a valuable model for future shale gas exploitation and commercialization in China.
In that perspective, this paper will argue that the current applicable legal framework is neither sufficient nor satisfactory, given what is at stake, in particular it questions how shale gas can represent a transitional fuel to renewable energy resources. This study aims to feed into and inform the ongoing debate on shale gas's prospects and China's strategic role in the global energy picture.
It concludes that a comprehensive legal and regulatory change is necessary in order to foster an environmental sound development of the shale gas sector in China in light of the need to increase energy security, to achieve the country's future energy and environmental objectives, and to assure a beneficial economic growth and societal development.
GOING UNCONVENTIONAL: THE REVOLUTIONARY ROLE OF SHALE GAS THROUGH THE PRISM OF

CHINA'S ENERGY MIX
The potential for shale gas development is being explored in several countries. 5 Shale gas is found in unconventional reservoirs, from which natural gas is extracted from the low permeable source rock itself using a combination of techniques such as hydraulic fracturing 6 and horizontal drilling, 7 which create fissures in the rock allowing the gas to flow more easily through it. Besides shale gas 5 Shale gas developments is currently being explored in several countries and shale gas reserves have been identified in some European countries, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, India, Pakistan and China.137 Exploratory drilling operations are underway in China and in parts of South America, particularly Argentina. 6 For a definition of "hydraulic fracturing", see supra note 3. 7 Horizontal drilling involves drilling a vertical well to the desired depth and then drilling laterally to access a larger portion of the reservoir. resources, there are other types of unconventional gas reservoirs: tight gas 8 and coal bed methane (CBM) 9 . That said, the present study concentrates on shale gas because of the recent enormous increase in shale gas production and its potential for China's energy mix and supply. 10 Shale gas is revolutionizing the world energy markets and industry. Vast deposits are being discovered throughout the world. China is aware of the role of unconventional gas 11 as a carbonfriendly energy source and pivotal element in achieving the country's future energy and environmental objectives: increasing energy security, decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, 12 and ameliorating domestic air quality while simultaneously empowering the country to persevere a 8 Tight gas refers to natural gas that is trapped in sandstones. For the significance of this energy sources in China, see
Dai Jinxini, Ni Yunyan & Wu Xiaoqi, Tight Gas in China and Its Significance in Exploration and Exploitation 39(3) PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 277-284 (2012).
9 CBM is natural gas that is produced from coal seams, which act as the source and reservoir for the natural gas. China's focus has historically been on CBM, but recently its focus has shifted towards developing its shale gas resources. 10 China's potential unconventional gas reservoirs are significant, although many still need to be exactly estimated. The political support to shale gas is also relevant, and the Chinese Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) announced "a strategic goal of reaching a production target of 15-30 BCM (billion cubic meters) by 2020." See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, MEDIUM-TERM OIL & GAS MARKETS 185 (2010). To achieve this goal, China will have, inter alia, to acquire fracking technology and expertise. In that sense, the state-owned company Sinopec has already launched a dialogue with international oil companies in furtherance of this goal. What is more, in November 2009, China and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to jointly cooperate in assessing China's shale gas resources and foster investments in this sector. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, MEDIUM-TERM OIL & GAS MARKETS 185, 188 (2010).
beneficial economic growth and societal development. 13 A 2013 assessment of international shale gas resources issued by the U.S. Energy Information Administration 14 cited technically recoverable shale gas resources in China at 1,175 trillion cubic feet, 15 nearly 50 percent more than the United
States. 16 In reality, China's National Oil Companies have already commenced shale gas exploratory drilling with the technical and financial assistance of joint ventures with multinational companies such as Total, BP and Royal Dutch Shell. The rigid structure of China's state-controlled oil and gas industry hampers efforts to exploit reserves since the current absence of competition between the three state-owned energy giants (CNPC, Sinopec and PetroChina) is not conducive to a fair allocation of resources. In that sense, the country's current energy regulation features overregulation of the energy market, a fragmented system of regulation and insufficient environmental regulation. 17 Moreover, numerous Chinese investments into North American shale basins show that
Beijing's engagement in exploring the potential of shale gas resources is concrete as China is exponentially building its shale gas capacity in order to achieve energy security and influence in the world's gas pricing regimes.
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In that sense, what appears to emerge is a growing Chinese 14 The Energy Information Administration is an independent arm of the U.S. Department of Energy. 15 Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41
Countries Outside the United States (2013 report ). See also Li Shizhen, The Status of World Shale Gas Exploration and Development and Implications for China 6 GEOLOGICAL BULLETIN 918-924 (2010). (in Chinese
. 16 China has an estimated 1,115 Tcf of risked, technically recoverable shale gas, mainly in marine-and lacustrinedeposited source rock shales of the Sichuan (626 Tcf), Tarim (216 Tcf), Junggar (36 Tcf), and Songliao (16 Tcf) basins. Additional risked, technically recoverable shale gas resources totaling 222 Tcf exist in the smaller, structurally more complex Yangtze Platform, Jianghan and Subei basins. Shale gas leasing and exploration drilling already are underway in China, focused in the Sichuan Basin and Yangtze Platform areas and led by PetroChina, Sinopec, and Shell and the government has set an ambitious but probably unachievable target for shale gas production of 5.8 to 9. China a net importer, but domestic production has been burgeoning, 20 increasing the share of natural gas in total energy requirements from 2 percent to 4 percent, and planning to reach 8 percent by 2015 and 10 percent by 2020.
However, carrying out an assessment of the development of shale gas industry in China, the current applicable legal framework is neither sufficient nor satisfactory, given what is at stake. China still has to adequately delineate a policy framework regarding energy regulation and physical infrastructures, pricing mechanisms, as well as management of environmental risks that may be connected to the development of its unconventional gas resources. The exploitation of natural reserves is a strategic sector for national security and, in that sense, it is highly sensitive to political influences and extremely prone to state intervention. The central government firmly controls shale gas blocks by granting exploration rights and organizing auctions.The first round of tendering for shale gas exploration rights in June 2011 was held in the form of an invitation tender, and only state-and province-controlled oil and gas enterprises could bid on gas drilling project, namely, China National Off-shore Oil Corporation, Sinopec,PetroChina, Yanchang Petroleum, China United
Coalbed Methane Corporation and Henan CBM. The exclusion of foreign companies from those eligible to obtain production licenses aimed at retaining control over the scope of investments and the production ratio.The second round of tendering was held in October 2012 and it opened up bidding to state-owned enterprises in other industries and to privately-held Chinese investment entities as well (Sinochem, Zhenhua Oil) in order to foster greater competition and innovativeness in the infant shale gas industry. However, the Chinese government still has enormous leeway in deciding which enterprises can access its shale gas industry and the entry of non-state Chinese companies will not change this situation given that these entities continue to rely on cooperation with state-controlled PetroChina, which owns and runs the national transmission network.
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Nevertheless, foreign companies are not able to bid or act independently for either extraction or infrastructure projects, as they are merely allowed to operate under approved joint ventures with Chinese firms. Domestic companies apply for permits to explore and develop sites, after which they can enter partnerships with foreign investors. 22 Accordingly, the principal technique to foster production and use of unconventional natural gas is through government-set goals and mandates, which State-run entities, with some participation from private companies, pursue with projects and adequate investments.
What is more, it remains to be seen what the implications will be in terms of environmental costs.
Shale gas is obtained through hydraulic fracturing (or "fracking"), a controversial extracting technology which creates, as highlighted by the shale gas boom that took in place in the U.S., 23 critical environmental threats, namely contamination of freshwater aquifers by fracturing fluids and depletion of local water supplies. In China, these obstacles to the mature development of the country's unconventional gas reserves are accrued by two deeply intertwined hurdles: the absence of a comprehensive legal framework specifically addressing the potential environmental hazards of shale gas production; and weak enforcement of relevant laws and regulations. Acknowledging the importance of shale gas as a bridging source of energy in the shift from fossil fuels to clean energy, the primary need is minimizing environmental damages related to the process of shale gas extraction and achieving the goal of extracting shale gas in an environmentally responsible way, which is mainly a matter of regulation and enforcement. In the last decade, the United States have taken the lead in exploration, development, technology, production, and export of shale gas, as we shall explore below. Consequentially their experience could be helpful for other countries, such as China, in order to develop their own shale gas industries.
A TRANSITIONAL FRAMEWORK TO ALTERNATIVE ENERGY?
Shale gas has been widely referred as a "bridge fuel", implying its capability to move towards the replacement of hydrocarbons with carbon-free renewable resources as our primary source of energy. 24 This concept acknowledges that renewable resources cannot replace hydrocarbons as our primary generating fuel in the near term, and that while shale gas remains a hydrocarbon, it has less detrimental consequences on the environment than other fossil fuels. In that respect, what appears to emerge is that, at the moment, renewable resources are less cost-competitive than fossil fuels, in particular natural gas. 25 25 It costs two to five times as much to generate electricity through use of renewable resources such as solar and wind as through use of gas. Furthermore, given that most renewables can generate electricity exclusively on an intermittent basis, a unit of electricity generated through use of a renewable resource is worth only about 25% as much as a unit of electricity generated through use of gas. Paul L. On the other hand, displacement of coal with natural gas, including shale gas, as a generating fuel diminishes emissions of carbon dioxide by about fifty per cent. 27 Hence, the expression "bridge fuel" reflects the expectation of many policy makers that we can achieve mitigation of climate change in the near term by displacing coal with natural gas, but that we will entirely replace all hydrocarbons with carbon-free renewable resources in the longer term. 28 Clearly the practicality of this scenario is dependent on the ability to take measures adequate to assure society that hydraulic fracturing of shale basins can be carried out with low environmental costs. China is likely to greatly benefit from shale gas. The International Energy Agency foreshadows that China will consume more gas than the entire EU by 2035. 29 Being the country the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions and the largest source of increase in greenhouse gas emissions, China's capacity to substitute coal with cheaper gas as its primary electricity generating fuel has the potential to represent a huge step toward global warming mitigation.
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However, shale gas carries the danger of slowing down investment in renewable energies.
Particularly, some critics suggest that the industry's focus on developing shale gas and other unconventional sources is removing attention and capitals from the development of renewables as low-cost power generated with copious natural gas supplies and this could frustrate the economic viability of wind, solar and geothermal projects, eventually delaying the shift to renewable energies by many years. 31 Indeed, in the U.S. shale gas as a source of low-priced electric power created a 34 Instead of being thought of as competitors, however, natural gas and renewable energy sources should be seen as complementary, not competitive, components of the power sector. Natural gas plants can quickly scale up or down their electricity production and so can act as an effective hedge against the intermittency of renewables. The Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), June 2013, Leveraging Natural Gas to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Summary Report (The Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), June 2013), available at http://www.c2es.org/publications/leveraging-natural-gas-reduce-greenhouse-gas-emissions. 35 direct releases of methane into the atmosphere. during the extraction process. Emissions of methane are mainly caused by 'flowback' of the water forced into the rock formation during fracking, and by leaks in processing, and during transportation. Recent studies suggest that these losses can be limited by the use of best technology, but cannot be completely avoided. 37 In that respect it is crucial to precisely measure the GHGs emissions from natural gas production and consumption to minimize emissions reductions along the entire natural gas value chain. 38 As technologies for producing shale gas continue to advance and the industry is growing in scale, wider collaboration on R&D issues among governmental agencies and international energy governance institutions is required.
In the light of the aforesaid, a growing body of scientific research questions how shale gas could ever be a transitional fuel able to shift us from our current over-reliance on fossil fuels to a greater use of sustainable renewable energy, given its carbon intensity and level of investment needed.
39
Furthermore, shale gas could attract costly regulation. In fact, analyzing the current energy consumption forecasts, fossil fuels are likely to constitute a significant portion of general energy supplies into the foreseeable future. Provided that natural, and shale, gas prices remain low, there will be fewer inducements to invest in greener sources. Hence, in order to satisfy their carbon reduction targets, there is a risk that governments could force the energy industry to make these investments through regulation, which greatly augment costs across the entire oil and gas industry, with dramatic repercussions on highly cost-sensitive shale gas investments, projects and operations. 38 Indeed, natural gas is not carbon-free. On the contrary, it releases emissions by its combustion. Moreover it contains methane (CH4), a potent greenhouse gas, whose release during production, transmission, and distribution may offset the beneficial climate outcome of shale gas use.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS: WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Shale gas is a clear and efficient burning fuel with the potential to lower carbon emissions.
Nevertheless, risks remain and shale gas' greater role in the world overall energy mix has met with fierce opposition due to environmental concerns over the hydraulic fracturing technology and its potential to cause environmental harm in the shale gas context 41 with its shallower deposits, greater permeability and more superficial formations. 42 Fracking involves drilling a well bore into the reservoir rock formation and then forcing water, sand and chemicals into the well at high pressure to create fractures or fissures in the rock. Once the fracture is open, the released gas flows out of the fractures and into the well bore. In addition to shale gas, the process has recently been applied to extract gas from coal seam and tight sand deposits. These considerations imply that the extent to which shale gas will be a larger element of the energy mix will depend on the environmental protection versus economic growth trade-off. Some states in the U.S. and some EU countries, such as France, have already banned or imposed moratoria on hydraulic fracturing due to environmental concerns, 43 trying to harmonize environmental risks with energy security benefits. Conversely, China may opt for accepting greater environmental risks in order to bolster shale gas production and thus satisfying growing domestic energy demands as well as create new jobs that full-scale production would generate in particular for low-skilled workers. 44 However, it is one thing finding 41 The focus of this study on the environmental aspects related to shale gas exploration and extraction should not make us oblivious of the other issues that may impact on the development of global unconventional gas resources: fiscal conditions, landowner acceptance, interference from local authorities, pipeline and infrastructure issues, availability of technology, equipment and skilled labor force, and gas players' experience. Susan L. It is crucial to assess how harmful the fracking process might be to the environment. 45 Principal concerns include groundwater contamination with fracking chemicals, 46 gasification, 47 water usage risks, surface water and soil risks spills and blow-outs. Environmentalist argue that although hydraulic fracturing is believed to be less water intensive than nuclear and coal, it is unlikely that it will replace either energy source. Rather, shale gas development carries the danger to create an additional demand for water. Shortage of water is one of the most crucial issues facing shale gas development in China as water is a fundamental element in the fracking process. 48 In shale gas rich Sichuan Basin, this is a primary concerns due to the province's agricultural legacy which furnishes the country with roughly 7 percent of China's rice, wheat, and other grains. Moreover, the use of recycled water for hydraulic operations is highly advisable, given the intense residential and industrial demand for water in Sichuan and water scarcity concerns in Xinjiang. Regulations should also consider the possibility of establishing a closed-loop system of energy production, using mine drainage water from coal production (after having neutralized and removes heavy metals) thus integrating industrial ecology practices into the fracking process. However, this practice should only 47 When gas migrates into groundwater, the build-up of pressure due to gasification may lead to tremors or explosions.
Aquifer gasification due to shale gas development has been cited as a potential cause for recent minor seismic activity in the United Kingdom, though these claims are largely uncertain at this point and being investigated. See KPMG Global Energy Institute, supra note 22.
be implemented after groundwater regulations are strengthened, and after China has gained substantial experience in minimizing pollution from fracturing operations and can ensure proper disposal of the heavy metal waste products from treating these industrial water sources.
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Water is an urgent issue for China as its per capita availability of drinking water is very low and water resources are not well distributed through the country. 50 Diverging water supplies from the agriculture to shale gas production could be catastrophic, in particular if the contaminated water also pollutes the farmlands. Conversely, for other shale gas basins in Tarim, Xinjiang, and Inner
Mongolia, the scarcity of water is aggravated by the arid and hot climate. Shale gas exploration and production would thus require water to be carried from other parts of the country, which would unsustainably raise costs and the environmental impact. Furthermore, climate change and China's rapid economic development has led to an increase in industrial and agricultural water consumption, while areas of desertification are expanding, deteriorating the ecological environment which is already over-exploited. 55 Those water resource management systems, specifically aim at ensuring the security of water supplies, protecting the ecological resources of the water environment, and improving the efficiency of the local level water supply and wastewater treatment. Those regulatory objectives are achieved through different instruments, inter alia, consensual agreements among all stakeholders and technical advice. The financial resources originated from water pricing and the enforcement of the consumer-pays principle for quantitative management and the polluter-pays principle for pollution control. Id.
pollution from industry and agriculture are dangerously high, shale gas should be developed and extracted relying on a regulatory and institutional framework capable to reduce any related environmental hazards, sticking a balance between energy security benefits and environmental costs, in order to universally guarantee the right to water.
The recognition of the right to water has been debated in a number of international law fora 56 and in 2010 China voted in favor of a UN General Assembly resolution recognizing the right to water as a human right. 57 Resolution 64/292 acknowledges that clean drinking water and sanitation are integral to the realization of all human rights. Accordingly, the right to water imposes a burden on China to develop new policies and rules to ensure safe drinking water for its population. However, the resolution does not have a legally binding effect and it is generally regarded as a soft law legal instrument. The vote in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution is an important first step but
China should pursue a formal recognition of the right to water in international and domestic laws in order to grant its citizens legal entitlement against the State in case of serious interferences with the enjoyment of the right to water, which requires State to adopt, inter alia, effective legislation to restrain third parties from polluting water resources. 58 In China new regulations have been adopted to protect the environment but lack of control and enforcement measures remains a crucial problem.
Recognition of the right to water within the national political and legal systems by way of legislative implementation would constitute a first step in the right direction, 59 but it should be accompanied by 56 The right to water is a crucial element in the work of the Human Rights Council, the United Nations General
Assembly as well as of many scholars and NGOs. In September 2020, a resolution adopted by consensus by the Human Rights Council affirmed that the right to water and sanitation is recognized in existing international law. Another issue has triggered widespread public concerns: hydraulic fracturing is also supposedly responsible for a number of incidences of seismic activity such as minor earthquakes and tremors.
These seem to be caused by either the fracking process itself or the injection of fracking wastewater into wells. So far, there has been a more than four-fold increase in earthquakes of magnitude three and greater in central U.S. since 2008, "almost certainly" caused by fracking activities. 61 Similarly, in April and May 2011 shale gas exploratory drilling has been suspended in Lancashire, U.K., following two earthquakes with magnitudes of 1.5 and 2.3. A consequent independent scientific report commissioned by the British government indicated that "the earthquake activity was caused by direct fluid injection" during the fracking process". 62 This of course has relevant implications for local residential and infrastructure damage. Seismic activity could also impacts on well's integrity and cause further underground water contamination, as it could create leakages and new fractures, besides deforming well casings. Moreover, Sichuan province, where most of the Chinese shale gas is located, is an earthquake extremely prone region (The 2008 Great Sichuan Earthquake killed 69,195 people, with over 18,300 missing).
CHINESE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The current Chinese regulatory framework lacks cohesive and satisfactory provisions regarding shale gas extraction and its related environmental concerns. What appears to emerge is a generalized absence of cohesiveness of the energy resources system which is characterized by institutional fragmentation and conflicts of interests among a plethora of relevant entities and actors. The
Chinese legal system features a tripartite structure: the National People's Committee passes Laws; There are currently no Chinese laws that explicitly tackle the environmental risks of the fracking process; moreover, although shale gas development is part of China's current Five Year Strategic Plan, the Chinese government has not passed legislation or provided any guidance for shale gas exploration, market application, and strategic planning. Despite this, several existing laws, if broadly interpreted, might be applied, although they are neither exclusively concerned nor purposely drafted to deal with shale gas. In particular, the most pertinent law vis-à-vis shale gas production and its potential environmental perils is the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law importance of ecological civilization as a key element for the well-being of the Chinese people and the future of the country. The Report also develops the concept of "Beautiful China", introducing a notion of development that emphasizes the strategic relevance of environmental protection even when this could be in contrast with energy security and economic development.
78 "Clean production" is understood as a new industrial mode featuring technical plausibility, economic rationality and eco-efficiency, which is at the core of realizing a hazardless industry, i.e., the production is organized in accordance with ecological principles, and the raw materials are recycled in a closed cycle. China has a number of laws that could play a role vis-à-vis shale gas production. However, a comprehensive policy on this issue is still to be shaped, as there has not yet been consensus on the best way to proceed, The Chinese government has nevertheless introduced some incentives to foster the development of shale gas. In December 2011, China's State Council approved changing the legal status of shale gas from "natural resource" to an "independent mining resource", meaning that now it is exempted from the restrictive legal regime in effect for the exploration and production of hydrocarbons in China. This change of legal status disentangled shale gas from the oil and gas franchise, which precludes wider social investment from natural gas extraction, whilst giving private capital the opportunity to engage in this process.
FUTURE REGULATIONS: INCENTIVES, SUBSIDIES
Some commentators 83 believe that the Chinese policy on the development and production of shale gas will likely reflect the one adopted for coalbed methane (CBM). 84 This would imply a patchwork of import tax reductions or exemptions for technology imports that are used for shale gas exploration; exemptions of prospecting and mining royalties; and production subsidies. The government is indeed already relying on the policy developed for CBM as a reference for shaping a Chinese shale gas development policy. 85 In particular, it is interesting to analyze the environmental policies defined in the context of CBM and coal-mine methane (CMM), which could inspire new measure applicable to shale gas production. Specifically, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued the Emission Standard of CBM/CMM in 2008, embracing new coal mines, surface drainage systems, and existing mines and systems. As for foreign cooperation policies, exploration of CBM through foreign companies has to be consistent with domestic regulation on on-shore petroleum resources, in order to guarantee a minimum standard, which would also be advisable in the shale gas sector. Cooperation must be rooted in standard production-sharing contracts (PSC), which represent one of the main forms of international cooperation in the development of oil and gas in China, according to which the foreign investor bears all the costs and risks incurred during the exploration, 83 See, infra note 84, 85. 84 Coal Bed Methane (CBM): CBM is natural gas that is produced from coal seams, which act as the source and reservoir for the natural gas. 
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A specific fiscal policy for energy firms engaging in these sectors should be supported. For example, for all CBM energy companies, value-added taxes are reimbursed after being levied.
Similarly, import duties, import-related tax, and value-added taxes are exempted for CBM exploration and development operations, equipment, spare parts, and special tools. Preferential corporate income taxes are also desirable. For instance, the Chinese government has levied corporate income taxes for independent CBM domestic companies at a favored rate of 25 percent starting from 2008. Likewise, domestic energy companies working in cooperation with foreign companies on CBM are granted a preferred corporate income tax policy according to which income tax is exempted in the first two years from the profit-making year, and then levied with a 50 percent reduction in the following three years. This scheme could allow energy companies to successfully cope with the high initial costs of shale gas production in order to spur investments and technology development. Finally, arguing that the marginal cost of China's shale gas production is significantly higher than conventional gas, a subsidizing policy is advisable in order to help enterprises engaging in shale gas development and make shale gas in China commercially viable. This technique has already been adopted for by the Ministry of Finance for energy companies engaged in CBM/CMM extraction within China which are entitled to a financial subsidy of 0.02 CYN per cubic meter from the central government if the gas is employed on site or commercialized for residential use or as a chemical feedstock.
The Chinese government has already offered to shale gas mining enterprises a subsidy of 0.4 CYN per cubic meter from 2012 to 2015, which is twice the subsidy provided for coal bed methane. 
BETTER ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS THROUGH TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION
The breakthrough of shale gas exploration and production in China is undermined by the country's unsatisfactory record of environmental enforcement which jeopardizes the capacity of existing laws to prevent and minimize the downsides of hydraulic fracturing. China relies on a multilevel system of authority based on the central supervision of local governments to guarantee adequate legal enforcement. Environmental regulations are accordingly enforced at the local level through central Government Regional Supervision Centers (RSCs) and local governments' Environmental Protection Bureaus 89 which are responsible for supervising the implementation of central laws;
investigating major pollution events; coordinating and settling trans-boundary environmental disputes; and receiving and coordinating complaints. However, the efficiency of the Government RSCs is weakened by several constraints as the Centers are extremely underfunded, which results in weak governmental enforcement capacity, and they are financed by local governments, causing conflicts of interest, corruption and complicity. 90 Moreover, the RSCs lack enforcement authority over local government Environmental Protection Bureaus. To overcome these hindrances the RSC's role should be reinforced by providing specific legal tools and conferring the Centers more adequate funding and greater powers. usually impose environmental disclosure requirements for enterprises as mandatory, but merely encourage companies to take their own initiative in providing the relevant information.
Environmental disclosure and transparency directly affect social acceptance, which is a key element for the long-run success of shale gas development, as the previous North American experience shows. It is crucial to develop mutual-trust and mutual-benefit relation between the shale gas industry and relevant local communities. This would minimize the social risk for the developer whilst involving the community in the decision-making process and ensuring tangible and equitable benefits from the project. In this vein, strong transparency initiatives and mandatory disclosure of environmental information represent a crucial step towards a safer regulation of shale gas development and a better enforcement of domestic environmental laws.
LEARNING FROM THE UNITED STATES?
Although evident differences, similarities between China and the United States in the context of shale gas emerge. Shale gas is a pivotal element for the energy future of both countries, where energy security, energy efficiency and environmental concerns are deeply intertwined. These two countries are net energy importers, hence striving to guarantee greater energy security by boosting domestic resources. Finally, their regulatory frameworks are not completely dissimilar, as both have far reaching federal or central laws enforced by designated agencies. Furthermore, both countries exhibit a gap between the formulation of federal/central law and their enforcement at the local level. These similarities between the American and Chinese energy system allow drawing some parallels which could be beneficial to the Chinese shale gas industry.
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102 However, the two countries have different geological characteristics. In particular hydraulic fracturing in China is much more geographically challenging than in the U.S., mainly because Chinese shale gas is found in much rougher and deeper terrain than American shale gas, which is usually placed within two to six kilometers deep, whereas in China some key deposits are found six kilometers deep. Hence, the expertise derived from the U.S. shale industry may not be directly functional to China as it would demand more experienced staff, supplementary equipment, technological innovation, and augmented costs. Additionally, the quality of the shale rock and gas in China is also different than the U.S. as it is more difficult to be fractured and contains much more non-hydrocarbon gasses, which means that Chinese shale gas is of a lower quality and consequentially may be costly in the long-term as China may be compelled to define ways in which to render the gas more usable. Shale gas development has deeply modified the energy scenario in the United States from a status of shortage to that of plenty and the country, which is the world's biggest energy consumer, may soon become the largest producer of hydrocarbons. 103 As a consequence of the shale gas revolution, North America's natural gas base, now estimated at 3,400 trillion cubic feet, could provide for current levels of consumption for over a hundred years. 104 Shale gas, replacing oil as the principal agent of a new global energetic equilibrium, is already transforming global energy relations and the impact will be more evident when gas exports will begin (the first LNG exports are expected to start around 2017). There are several LNG terminals located in the U.S., originally constructed to import gas, which are now looking to start exporting from the US, possibly to Europe, India and China as a way to extend their sphere of influence, while reducing the dominance of the Middle East and Russia in the gas sector. The shale gas revolution has modified the economics of oil and gas production in the U.S. reducing dependence on imported oil and gas supplies and reinforcing domestic manufacturing through lower energy costs.
The U.S. successful shale gas development is due, inter alia, to a conducive regulatory environment enrooted in a cooperative federalism framework. 105 In fact, the entire process is regulated by a mixture of states and federal agencies. The formers are responsible for drilling, while the latters have ultimate authority over water treatment and disposal. However, federal government has delegated much of its power to states whose regulations meet or exceed federal minimum standards.
Consequentially, while at the federal level, the U.S. has long-established environmental guidelines regulating oil and gas industries, at the state level, regulations concerning the shale industry differ depending on the political inclinations toward the extraction industry. 110 Moreover, under pressure from big oil companies, the U.S. Congress exempted oil and gas production from numerous health and safety laws. 111 Hence, states have primary responsibility for establishing and enforcing safeguards for shale gas production. This regulatory framework is subject to strong controversy as some argue that drilling is a basically unregulated activity. In particular, shale gas can pose significant environmental cross-border issues that cannot be tackled with inconsistent and potentially conflicting legislation at the state level. It is thus likely that the next decade will see much argument about whether federal agencies should have more authority. As for China, a regulatory model fostering cooperation and delegation of responsibilities between provinces and central power would imply other aspects to come into play, such as lack of effective enforcement of environmental standards and information asymmetry. 106 At the time of writing this article, the State of New York had not yet decided whether to lift a 5-year-old moratorium on hydrofracturing. However, in May 2013 a midlevel court unanimously concluded that the state mining and drilling law does not trump the authority of local governments to control land use. Indeed, more than 50 New York municipalities have already banned shale gas drilling and more than 100 have enacted moratoriums on drilling activities. Over the last decade the political attitude towards shale gas has been changing and more consideration is given to concerns regarding shale's potential detrimental effects on the environment, in particular water sources. Accordingly, the Obama's administration plans to enforce more stringent controls over drillers by forcing them to seize emissions of determined air pollutants from new wells beginning in 2015. 112 The rapid development of shale gas in the U.S. has nevertheless stoked environmental controversy and debate. The opportunity of taking the US regulatory framework as a model scheme remains debatable since the US are experiencing difficulties with environmental aspects related to shale gas extraction 113 , in particular given the complex barriers that developing countries such as China are facing in this sector. Nevertheless, it is likely that a comparative analysis might contribute to resolve some of these issues.
a. BARRIERS FOR ENTRY AND UNCERTAINTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
The U.S. success with shale gas is a result of the combination of indulgent federal enforcement, infrastructures, and technological know-how. Conversely, China falls behind due mainly to the very peculiarities of its present regulatory framework concerning shale gas, which is extremely vague and inconsistent and thus produces uncertainty for overseas investors and energy firms. 112 In President Barack Obama's March 30, 2011 energy proposal he pointed out that shale gas could play a large role in U.S. energy policy, particularly with the mitigation of its environmental impacts: "Recent technology and operational improvements in extracting natural gas resources, particularly shale gas, have increased gas drilling activities nationally and led to significantly higher natural gas production estimates for decades to come. The Administration is taking steps to address these [environmental] concerns and ensure that natural gas production proceeds in a safe and responsible manner. Moreover, the barriers for entry for small and large firms into the American shale gas industry were much lower as individual companies were able to lease or acquire land to explore. They were only required to submit paperwork to the state government. On the contrary, the Chinese central government firmly exerts power on shale gas blocks by organizing auctions or granting exploration rights. This scheme creates various barriers to entry for overseas small and large firms into the domestic shale gas industry 114 as firms to be allowed to auctions had to be either Chinese or Chinese held joint-ventured companies and they needed to have an extremely elevated minimum value. 115 In particular, the approval system for foreign investments in the mineral industry, embracing any underground activities, is subject to both foreign capital and industry access approval mechanisms.
The former implies a multi-tiered administrative approval system according to which authorities of different levels exercise different powers over different industrial categories and total investments amount. As for industry access, China enforces an authorization scheme for the exploration and exploitation of underground natural resources. Specifically, the investor must apply for registration, hold an exploitation or explorations license and gain the right of exploration and exploitation. As one might expect, such burdensome policy for foreign investments in Chinese mineral industry is far from conducive and favorable to shale gas production. Joint ventures between domestic and foreign companies through both inbound and outbound investments for extraction technology and potentially for infrastructure development seem to be the best strategy in this early stage of the shale gas industry. Obviously, Chinese restrictions on foreign investments constitute a relevant barrier.
Furthermore, investors will likely wait to see what shale gas pricing policies and government support mechanisms are put in place before actually investing in the Chinese shale gas, as uncertainty and regulatory changes might have detrimental effects on them. Energy White Paper call for the introduction of private capital and market mechanisms, which would terminate the current energy monopoly that excites lack of supervision and inefficiency.
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The only way China could improve its future energy policy is by converting non-market mechanisms to the market mechanism; adopting a modern corporate system for energy companies;
and turning the governmental management system into limited supervision from strict controls.
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Another strong disincentive to investments in this sector is the uncertainty of environmental policies. Currently, energy companies in China cannot rely on the assurance that shale gas' environmental regulations will be similar to the ones issued for coalbed methane, natural gas, oil, or coal. Hence, stakeholders cannot conduct a precise risk analysis nor cost-benefit analysis as there is no concrete minimum standard to count on. This uncertainty is in sharp contrast compared with the specific minimum federal regulations concerning emissions, the treatment of water, and the land that U.S. energy companies had to deal with when they started to engage in the shale gas' industry.
Those clear criteria allowed them to elaborate accurate risk assessment analysis, even though stakeholders were eventually not required to comply with these standards due to the 2005 Energy Policy Act.
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b. FISCAL AND PRICING REGIME
The current Chinese shale gas regulatory framework should be enhanced in two particular sectors, namely, the fiscal and pricing regimes, which are key elements in fostering needed investments and promoting efficient usage of resources. Under China's production-sharing contracts, international energy companies must share a relevant percentage of their profits with the government or government-owned companies, besides paying corporate taxes on gains. This creates a deterrent for overseas investors in a high-risk activity such as shale gas exploration and production. 71 Conversely, the U.S. regulatory regime based on royalties requires energy firms to merely pay a portion of project revenues and corporate taxes on gains. The first unconventional gas drilling operations were supported by a federal tax credit provided by the so-called Section 29, a provision contained in the 1980 windfall profits tax bill that played a great role in developing other two forms of unconventional gas, coal bed methane and gas from tight sands. 122 Regardless of the discouraging
Chinese fiscal framework, a number of oil multinational companies have been enticed by the potential of Chinese shale gas market (e.g. Royal Dutch Shell, BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips). In 2011, Sinopec inked deals with Eni and ExxonMobil aimed at the investigation of the potential of the Chinese shale plays. In March 2012, Shell became the first company to sign a formal production-sharing agreement with a Chinese entity, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which will accommodate Shell with a relevant stake in China's shale gas production.
121 See the 2005 Energy Policy Act, supra note 108.
122 See Yergin, supra note 25, at 328.
As for the Chinese pricing regime for natural gas, it is a mosaic of different market and administered prices, defined according to consumers, wholesale versus retail, onshore versus offshore, and so on.
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The lack of a national pricing structure is creating uncertainty for potential investors. The Twelfth Fiveyear Plan (2011-2015) foresees a doubling of the output of gas-fired power plants and an increase in the consumption of natural gas by households. This is the reason why the price of natural gas is kept at an artificially depressed level which is lower than the international market price. The consequent gap with domestic prices forces Chinese firms to import gas at a loss, significantly reducing natural gas potential relevance. The current government intervention and monopoly energy prices do not reflect the scarcity of resources and demand in the market. Furthermore, price distortions are not conducive to the effectiveness of market mechanisms and the allocation of resources, since energy prices are detached from the market, which forces the government to subsidize certain energy industries, worsening the financial burden.
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A price and regulatory reform is then much needed. Experimental price mechanisms have already been implemented starting from December 2011 in Guangdong province and in the Guangxi region, where gas prices are no longer kept artificially lower than the market price levels but they are connected to the market price of fuel oil and liquefied petroleum gas imported to Shanghai, which is a Chinese hub for gas trading and consumption. Preferential pricing has already been adopted in other unconventional gas resources which present higher extraction costs as compared to conventional resources; reasonably these regimes could be extended to shale gas production. In particular the government has implemented several preferential policies to support coalbed methane and coalmine methane extraction and commercialization. Other policies include exemption from corporate tax for the first two years of production and a reduction of 50% for the following three years, exemption from mining rights fees, royalty fees, value-added tax (VAT), and feed-in-tariffs for coalbed methane and coalmine methane-fired power.
Large-scale production of shale gas in the U.S. is already transforming the worldwide dynamics of gas industry. The rapid growth of this new resources created a Globally, surplus of LNG, whose rapid buildup coincided with the emergence of shale gas as a new supply source. 125 Until 2010 the U.S. were indeed supposed to represent the greatest LNG market due to a projected domestic shortfall. Conversely, shale gas increase may transform the U.S. into LNG exporter, leaving much LNG in search for market that will be only partially absorbed by growing Asia. This over-supply of LNG determined a wider competition among gas suppliers and reduced prices. This is also modifying the economic and political equilibrium stemming from a new, wider geopolitical impact of global gas market which is determining a new gas competition. 126 As shale gas expands globally, we should assess the possible consequences of price development in relation to the potential establishment of an Organization of Gas Exporting Countries (OGEC), stemming from the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GEFC), a gas-exporting countries recurrent forum having its headquarters in Doha, Qatar (which is the main gas supplier to Europe, after Russia). In particular, if gas prices further lower reducing exporters' revenues, this would constitute an incentive for an OGEC to take the lead and defend falling prices. 127 It remains to be seen to what extent the GECF will potentially develop into an OGEC behaving like a cartel. It is not clear how such a cartel would fix the gas rice, either enacting price-fixing mechanisms or imposing production quantitative restrictions. In reality, traded gas is often subject to long-term contracts which feature rigid pricing terms supported by international commercial provisions. As one might expect, government interference in pricing terms would amount to a breach of such agreements triggering international arbitration in order to settle the contractual dispute. 
c. PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
125 In the US the surplus of domestic gas production is partly due to the mismatches between LNG projects start-ups and the completion of LNG tanker construction combined with the expiry of charter agreement for older tankers as a result of production declines in older projects. See Stevens, supra note 24, at 21.
Although China has a considerable reserve estimate, the development of shale gas as a key element of the country's energy mix may be undermined by the lack of adequate physical infrastructure, mainly gas pipelines for transport and delivery. Large-scale pipelines will have to be built to manage the capacity of targeted output and to transport product from the major gas fields, which could be challenging for smaller exploration and production firms. 129 In particular, there is no integrated national gas grid and most of China's infrastructures were constructed to transport its most important fuel, i.e. coal.
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Currently all principal gas transmission lines are owned by the state 131 and a number of new pipelines is needed. Developing transportation and storage facilities is crucial for shale gas expansion, and even though much still need to be done, China plans to build 14,400 miles of new gas pipelines between 2009 and 2015 to reinforce the current 21,000-mile network. 132 In addition,
China will need to construct or reinforce infrastructures that can safely dispose of the contaminated material used to fracture the shale rock thus protecting the environment. Energy expert Diana Ngo stresses that these factors are important as they will reduce costs caused by environmental damage occurring in the future. Additionally, these precautionary steps will also Indeed, Chinese state-owned gas producers have entered into major transactions with large international players to develop shale gas reserves in China and to exploit shale gas reserves in Western Canada and the United States.
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In particular, whether the GSGI can provide a regulatory model to develop unconventional natural gas resources in an environmental sensitive manner remains to be seen. In that respect, the appropriateness of the US legal framework as a model scheme is still debatable, given the problem that shale gas is creating in the US, especially related to the environment. While good progress on the exploration and development aspects of this agreement has been made, environmental cooperation is still lacking. This is in part due to the fact that the United States are still struggling to design the most adequate domestic regulatory framework for safeguards. Environmental protection is not the priority for either sides as they do not want to jeopardize the potential of China's shale gas by firmly pursuing environmental protection. At the same time, U.S. energy companies engaged in these bilateral exploration and development projects aim at exchanging assessment and extraction technology for Chinese commercial market access. On the other side, China strives for transferring technology from the United States which often implies intellectual property rights' concerns.
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Almost all fracking technology and experience is owned by U.S. companies and China needs to leverage them in order to develop its own shale gas services and industries. To this end, Chinese oil companies have already started investing into the U.S. shale market. Namely, China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has joined with Chesapeake Energy on production ventures and Sinopec partnered with Devon Energy in a similar deal. These agreements were minority interests in actual gas production and constituted investments to export fracking know-how and technologies through participation to the exploration and production team. 138 However, the way China will overcome the technology and experience barriers is still open to debate. Some commentators point out that as China's ultimate goal is to achieve and maintain energy security by developing its domestic natural resources, it cannot bid on U.S. technology and expertise. Accordingly, China will keep on investing in major foreign energy companies (as it happened with Chesapeake Energy and Devon Energy), and then it will import early models of hydraulic fracturing in order to develop its own domestic model of fracking technology by reverse engineering the technology. China optimizes the advantages from shale gas development, that is to say decreasing oil imports and pollution, while reducing the environmental hazards. Within the U.S.-China bilateral cooperation on shale gas development, a collaborative dialogue has already commenced, engaging governments, NGOs, the private sector, researchers and academia. This exchange should be reinforced and China should focus on importing and developing environmentally-friendly technologies, best practices, and a comprehensive regulatory framework to foster a safe and secure exploitation of its shale gas resources.
FUTURE VIABILITY OF SHALE GAS PRODUCTION IN CHINA
Given its abundance and capacity of burning cleaner than coal and oil, greatly expanded shale gas use in China seems likely, especially in electricity generation. Despite this optimistic and encouraging scenario, several risks could undermine its future viability. Firstly, companies engaging on shale gas production in China must take into account the huge financial risks of starting a venture in which it can take years before investments begin to generate returns. Furthermore, the limited availability of infrastructure would push costs even higher. In particular, the viability of shale gas is threatened by the uncertainty regarding if and when natural gas price will raise higher due to the end of current oversupply.
Secondly, price uncertainty makes the management of costs and financing risks hard. As energy companies engage in shale gas production, they need to keep a close eye on their procurement costs and invest in productivity, technological and capital improvements. Shale formation wells require 140 As it happened following the Fukushima nuclear meltdown in Japan, which increased American, and European, imperiled water supplies, provided the operations were carried out with accurate safety procedures. 143 Energy companies operating in China should not be exempted from adopting leading practices to mitigate environmental impact, preserve reputation, and avoid more stringent regulation which could preclude growth of the industry. For example, Shell Oil has tried to diffuse better industry practices and reinforce public perception by issuing its set of "Global Onshore Tight/Shale Oil and Gas Operating Principles". These guidelines outline a framework for how Shell and other oil and gas producers should safeguard the environment and the communities in which they drill for and produce natural gas and oil. These principles include: safe well design and operation; protection of groundwater and reduction of water use; emissions reduction and fugitive emissions control; reduction of surface impact; transparency and community engagement. This framework and strategy will allow producers to avoid negative regulatory repercussions for the entire sector. 144 Finally, as shale gas radically impacts on supply and demand of the world's energy mix and market, new geopolitical factors must be assessed also taking into account that, as far as China is concerned, economic and demographic growth will increase pressure on global energy supplies and thus all fuel sources will have to be exploited. 145 China has historically depended on fuel imports from politically sensitive regions, restraining its foreign policy options. 146 In particular it imported 54, 12
and 5 per cent of its oil, natural gas and coal, respectively in 2010. This predominant dependence on foreign energy poses different risks: disruptions to its imported energy, sustained and extremely 143 Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC), Institute for Energy and Transport, Unconventional Gas:
volatile energy prices and a clash between china's foreign policy interests and its oversea energy interests. 147 A copious shale gas production can help the country acquire security of energy supply, which could lead to a dramatic and radical change in its relationships with other nations. The emergence of this new resource in North America is already changing the dynamics of the global gas business and energy geopolitics, demonstrating that the gas market is truly global.
CONCLUSIONS
China is aware of the role of shale gas as a carbon-friendly energy source in meeting the country's future energy and environmental objectives. The rapid growth of the U.S. shale gas industry has
shown that it is a fuel for the future: a relatively low-carbon resources whose flexibility could play a major role as in electric power as an complement to greater reliance on renewable generation. The development of shale gas in China will likely depend on several factors: local reservoir characteristics; technology transfer and innovation, commercial considerations such as infrastructure availability and regulatory environment, applicable rules and laws governing water use. 148 The
Chinese government aims at developing resources as domestic as possible and to that purpose it is fostering internal competition among its national oil companies, some of which are already engaged in exploration and development of unconventional gas resources. It thus seems likely that foreign companies' role in China will be restricted to minority holdings in joint ventures with Chinese national oil companies. Overseas companies will be needed for their technical expertise to manage and deploy advanced exploration and development technologies. In this context, foreign companies must thus be aware of the risks related to a joint undertaking in countries that may not apply the same contractual principles and intellectual property rights safeguards. Another issue that must be addressed is environmental degradation, in particular since shale gas exploration and development is a water-intensive process and China's water supply is challenged by several problems: scarcity, rapid urbanization, contamination and pollution. The ability to protect water resources and reduce waste water would hold a key to whether shale gas industry would successfully develop in China.
147 See Bo Kong, supra note 54. In the light of the aforesaid, some essential elements of the potential Chinese shale gas development have to be pointed out. First, the need to design a comprehensive and conducive regulatory environment, legally implemented, which would take into consideration the environmental hazards related to shale gas exploration and production. Indeed, shale gas production in China is in its infancy and a sound regulatory system is required to assure long-term exploitation. An overarching effective unitary regulation would reduce the uncertainty in gas market and foster future investments offering attractive terms to private investors. 149 Second, China needs to tackle the unsatisfactory record of environmental enforcement which jeopardizes the capacity of existing laws to prevent the downsides of hydraulic fracturing. This can be accomplished through adoption of transparency initiatives and mandatory disclosure of environmental information. This would also help reducing the friction between Beijing's concerns over energy security and the opposition by reluctant local communities preoccupied with the environmental costs of shale gas exploration and extraction. Infrastructure development and technology transfer are equally needed, and the previous experience of the U.S. in this sector can be of great help to the Chinese shale gas industry. As part of this strategy, China's Ministry of Resources has invited some major oil and gas companies to pitch for shale gas exploration work, granting licenses for exploration in Western China.
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The Chinese national political climate for shale gas appears to be positive as well and in March 2012the first five-year shale gas development plan for the 2011-2015 period was jointly released by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Land and Resources and the National Agency of Energy. It calls for the development of a policy framework for the regulation of the country's shale gas sector and it ambitiously estimates that production will reach 6,5 billion cubic feet (bcf) in 2012 and 80 bcf in 2020 from its present production of zero. In this vein, according to the plan, China will develop projects for the "assessment for shale and confirming the current reserve estimates" 151 and a National Shale Gas Development Program has been adopted, in which great importance is given to R&D for technology, exploration, and development of shale gas in light of the Thirteenth Five Year Plan (2016-2020), which will greatly emphasize the importance of exploring unconventional and alternative energy sources. As long as China is pursuing joint ventures with foreign enterprises to 149 On the contrary, a rigid environmental legislation could inhibit shale gas exploration. This environmental friendly over-regulation, however, does not appear to be likely to develop in China. 150 See KPMG Global Energy Institute, supra note 22.
151 See Hu & Xu, supra note 88.
acquire know-how in shale gas exploration and extraction, it seems probable that the Chinese leadership will keep on encouraging and spurring shale gas commercial exploitation. An actual shale gas market is expected to occur over an extended period of time and although government support appears sound, it is hard to foresee how the market will shape until major policy decisions Concluding, a successful and adequate shale gas development in China would meet domestic demand and this new resource may grant China stronger bargaining power with gas exporters on price and other matters, narrowing the gap between North American and Asian natural gas prices.
The strategic significance of China in the shale gas revolution is undeniable in light of the current rise of energy prices and struggle for reducing harmful emissions in order to contain climate change.
It remains to be seen whether the "bridge fuel" will be a viable resource, capable of contributing to greater energy security while being developed in an environmentally sound manner in a country with a $12 trillion economy that is deeply embroiled in the global economy.
